The University of New Hampshire Law Review
Volume 9
Number 2 University of New Hampshire Law
Review

Article 9

March 2011

Territorial Sovereignty and the Evolving Boumediene Factors: Al
Maqaleh v. Gates and the Future of Detainee Habeas Corpus
Rights
Luke R. Nelson
University of New Hampshire School of La

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr
Part of the Law Commons, and the Terrorism Studies Commons

Repository Citation
Luke R. Nelson, Territorial Sovereignty and the Evolving Boumediene Factors: Al Maqaleh v. Gates and the
Future of Detainee Habeas Corpus Rights, 9 U.N.H. L. REV. 297 (2011), available at
http://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr/vol9/iss2/9

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – Franklin Pierce School
of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The University of
New Hampshire Law Review by an authorized editor of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more
information, please contact sue.zago@law.unh.edu.

File: Nelson - Vol. 9, Iss. 2, V2 (updated; use this doc)

Created on: 3/16/2011 9:38:00 PM

Last Printed: 3/21/2011 10:19:00 AM

Territorial Sovereignty and the Evolving Boumediene
Factors: Al Maqaleh v. Gates and the Future of Detainee
Habeas Corpus Rights
LUKE R. NELSON∗
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 298
II. BACKGROUND: FROM EISENTRAGER TO BOUMEDIENE................ 299
A. Johnson v. Eisentrager ......................................................... 300
B. Rasul v. Bush ....................................................................... 303
C. Boumediene v. Bush ............................................................ 305
III. AL MAQALEH V. GATES AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF
THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE TO BAGRAM DETAINEES .................. 307
A. The D.C. District Court ...................................................... 307
B. The D.C. Circuit ................................................................. 310
IV. ANALYSIS.................................................................................. 311
A. What is Left of Territorial Sovereignty in Today’s Habeas
Corpus Analysis? ................................................................. 311
1. Changing Definition of Sovereignty ................................. 312
2. Multiple Factors Beyond Territorial Sovereignty ............ 315
B. The Future of the Habeas Factors: Additional Factors and
Unanswered Questions ........................................................ 317
1. Additional Factors in Response to Today’s Conflicts ...... 317
a. Length of Confinement Without Adequate Status
Review………….……………………………………...318
b. Executive Manipulation................................................. 319
2. Unanswered Questions ..................................................... 320
C. Guidance on the Practical Obstacles .................................. 322
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 324

∗ B.A., University of Minnesota Duluth, 2007; J.D. Candidate, University of
New Hampshire School of Law, 2011. The author thanks Alice Briggs and Tom
Sanchez for their thoughtful edits and comments to this Note.

297

File: Nelson - Vol. 9, Iss. 2, V2 (updated; use this doc)

298

Created on: 3/16/2011 9:38:00 PM

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 3/21/2011 10:19:00 AM

Vol. 9, No. 2

I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2010, the U.S. government prosecuted in a civilian
federal court an accused terrorist detainee housed since 2004 at the
Guantanamo Bay Detention Center (Guantanamo Bay).1 The Obama Administration considered this trial a “test case” for prosecuting
accused terrorist detainees in civilian federal courts.2 Of the more
than 280 charges against the detainee defendant, a civilian jury convicted him of one count and acquitted him of the remaining charges.3
Yet, the defendant received a life sentence without parole.4
This “test case” is one example of a changing landscape in international armed conflict and detainee rights jurisprudence following
September 11, 2001. This Note discusses one area of American constitutional law that has clearly evolved in recent detainee rights litigation: the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause and extension of habeas corpus rights to detainees held beyond U.S. sovereign
territory.5
Historically, territorial sovereignty determined the extraterritorial
reach of the Suspension Clause.6 In 2008, however, Boumediene v.
Bush7 greatly impacted the role of territorial sovereignty in extraterritorial habeas jurisprudence. In Boumediene, the Supreme Court
developed a practical, multi-factor test for determining the reach of
the Suspension Clause while holding that federal courts were not
1. Benjamin Weiser, Detainee Acquitted on Most Counts in ’98 Bombings, N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
17,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/nyregion/
18ghailani.html?_r=1.
2. Id. The significance of this case is demonstrated by the trial judge’s finding
that the defendant’s “status of ‘enemy combatant’ probably would permit his detention as something akin ‘to a prisoner of war until hostilities between the United
States and Al Qaeda and the Taliban end . . . .” Id.; see also Benjamin Weiser, ExDetainee Gets Life Sentence in Embassy Blasts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/nyregion/26ghailani.html?_r=1&partner=rss
&emc=rss.
3. Weiser, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see also infra Part IV.
6. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950).
7. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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foreclosed from entertaining habeas petitions from Guantanamo Bay
detainees.8 This was the first decision to allow detainee foreign nationals held beyond U.S. sovereign territory to seek habeas corpus
relief through the federal courts.9 Now that Guantanamo Bay has
been addressed, recently, the focus has shifted to detainees held at
the Bagram Theater Internment Facility (Bagram) in Afghanistan.10
In May 2010, the D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh v. Gates11 held that
the balance of Boumediene’s multi-factor test weighed against extending the Suspension Clause to four detainees captured beyond
Afghanistan and detained at Bagram as unlawful enemy combatants.12 By analyzing the development of the Boumediene multifactor test and focusing on its application to the Bagram detainees,
this Note proposes that territorial sovereignty is no longer a controlling or driving factor in today’s extraterritorial habeas analysis. Furthermore, this Note provides a few practical recommendations for
future applications of the Boumediene multi-factor test and addresses
some unanswered questions in applying the test in future detainee
cases.
Part II provides a brief history of the extraterritorial habeas jurisprudence relating to foreign national detainees leading up to Al Maqaleh. Part III discusses the Al Maqaleh decisions in both the district court and the court of appeals. Part IV analyzes the declining
role that territorial sovereignty plays in today’s habeas analysis. Part
IV also discusses various unanswered questions that await decision
by the Supreme Court in applying the Boumediene test in future detainee cases.
II.

BACKGROUND: FROM EISENTRAGER TO BOUMEDIENE

The Suspension Clause states: “The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebel8. Id. at 766, 771.
9. Id. at 770.
10. See, e.g., Ari Shapiro, Is the Bagram Air Base the New Guantanamo?, NPR
(Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=111855
836.
11. 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Al Maqaleh II).
12. Id. at 99.
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lion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”13 “Habeas Corpus” means “that you have the body,” a mechanism allowing prisoners to challenge their government detention or confinement as unlawful.14 The writ of habeas corpus serves to protect individual constitutional rights as well as ensure a separation of powers and a
check on executive detention authority.15
Little case law exists prior to 2004 discussing the extraterritorial
reach of the Suspension Clause to foreign nationals detained beyond
U.S. sovereign territory. The leading case on the extraterritorial
reach of the Suspension Clause is Johnson v. Eisentrager,16 decided
in 1950.17
A. Johnson v. Eisentrager
In Eisentrager, the U.S. government suspected twenty-one German nationals, who were detained in China, of “continued military
activity against the United States after surrender of Germany [in
World War II].”18 All twenty-one nationals were prosecuted and
convicted under military commissions and later sent to a German
prison to serve their sentences.19 The detainees filed petitions in the
D.C. District Court for habeas corpus relief, claiming that, although
they were not U.S. citizens and had never stepped foot on U.S. sovereign territory, their convictions and imprisonments were unlawful.20
The D.C. Circuit refused to dismiss the petitions, holding that
“any person who is deprived of his liberty by officials of the United
States, acting under purported authority of that Government, and
who can show that his confinement is in violation of a prohibition of

13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
14. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004).
15. Tim J. Davis, Comment, Extraterritorial Application of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus After Boumediene: With Separation of Powers Comes Individual Rights,
57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1199, 1204–05 (2009).
16. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
17. See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 90 (stating that Eisentrager remained the
governing precedent until 2004).
18. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 766.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 767–68.
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the Constitution, has a right to the writ.”21 The Supreme Court interpreted the D.C. Circuit’s ruling as suggesting that “any person,
including an enemy alien, deprived of his liberty anywhere under
any purported authority of the United States is entitled to the writ.”22
The Supreme Court responded by reversing the D.C. Circuit’s judgment and affirming the district court’s dismissal of the petitions.23
In reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court in Eisentrager
arguably created a bright-line standard that defined the reach of the
Suspension Clause as ending at the legal borders, or sovereign territory, of the United States.24 Holding that constitutional habeas corpus relief does not extend to a foreign national engaged in war
against the United States and detained abroad, the Supreme Court
referenced the “inherent distinctions” between citizens and aliens.25
The Court further noted that the constitutional provisions are “universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction”26 and that it is the “alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that [gives] the Judiciary power to act.”27 In other words,
the Suspension Clause did not reach beyond U.S. sovereign territory
to individuals possessing little to no connection to the United States’
territory.
On the other hand, the Eisentrager majority discussed various
other factors beyond territorial sovereignty in reaching its decision,
thus indicating that multiple practical and objective factors could
determine the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause. The
majority stated that when a foreign national “increases his identity
21. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev’d, 339 U.S.
763 (1950) (emphasis added).
22. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 767 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 791.
24. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 835 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia stated that Eisentrager has always held “beyond any doubt” that
“the Constitution does not ensure habeas for aliens held by the United States in
areas over which our Government is not sovereign.” Id. The government’s main
argument in Boumediene also reiterated the contention that “noncitizens designated as enemy combatants and detained in territory located outside our Nation’s
borders have no constitutional right and no privilege of habeas corpus.” Id. at 739.
25. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768–69.
26. Id. at 771 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
27. Id.
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with [American] society,” situations could arise allowing foreign
national detainees to petition federal courts for habeas relief.28 The
Court then listed various factors that required it to reject extending
the Suspension Clause to the German nationals.29 Particularly, the
German nationals failed to increase their identities with American
society because each one:
(a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the
United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and
there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was
tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside
the United States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the United States.30
Eisentrager became the driving precedent in determining whether constitutional habeas corpus protections extend to foreign nationals detained beyond U.S. sovereign territory. This precedent would
continue to control until 2003, when U.S.-led military operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan were initiated, drastically changing the entire
nature of international armed conflict.31
September 11, 2001 marked the beginning of a remarkable
change in U.S. foreign policy and the state of international armed
conflict. Not only would the United States engage in armed conflicts
in both Afghanistan and Iraq as a result of 9/11, but the post-9/11 era
fittingly became known as a “Global War on Terrorism,” reflecting
the global front to fighting the enemy and the lack identifiable enemy nations.32 As the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq escalated,

28. Id. at 770.
29. Id. at 777.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Methods of the “War on Terror,” 16 MINN. J. INTL. L. 371, 374–384 (2007) (discussing certain provisions of
international law regulating today’s law of war).
32. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Sept.
20,
2001),
available
at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda,
but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach
has been found, stopped, and defeated.”); Guy Raz, Defining the War on Terror,

File: Nelson - Vol. 9, Iss. 2, V2 (updated; use this doc)

2011

Created on: 3/16/2011 9:38:00 PM

AL MAQALEH V. GATES

Last Printed: 3/21/2011 10:19:00 AM

303

suspected “unlawful enemy combatants”33 were captured, transported, and detained in military prisons, most notably at Guantanamo Bay, located just ninety miles beyond U.S. sovereign territory.34
Under Eisentrager and its progeny, the capture and detainment of
foreign nationals as unlawful enemy combatants anywhere beyond
U.S. sovereign territory was believed to restrict any successful attempt by a foreign national at obtaining habeas corpus relief. In fact,
Bush Administration officials relied heavily on the Eisentrager
precedent in deciding to hold accused terrorist detainees at Guantanamo Bay.35 Then, beginning in 2004, the Supreme Court addressed
Eisentrager’s historical precedent.
B. Rasul v. Bush
Within two years after enemy combatants were transported and
detained at Guantanamo Bay, the Supreme Court, in Rasul v. Bush,36
addressed whether foreign national detainees held beyond U.S. sovereign territory could seek habeas corpus relief, not under the Constitution, but, under the federal habeas statute.37 Rasul involved two
Australians and twelve Kuwaiti enemy combatants who challenged
NPR (Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
Id=6416780.
33. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat. 2600,
2601 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1) (2006)) (defining “unlawful enemy combatant”).
34. Tung Yin, The Role of Article III Courts in the War on Terrorism, 13 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1061, 1080–81 (2005) (discussing reasons for transporting
detainees to Guantanamo Bay).
35. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 828 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he President’s Office of Legal Counsel advised [the President] that the great
weight of legal authority indicates that a federal district court could not properly
exercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained at Guantanamo Bay.”) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted); Edward F. Sherman, Terrorist Detainee
Policies: Can the Constitutional and International Law Principles of the Boumediene Precedents Survive Political Pressures?, 19 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 207,
208 (2010).
36. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
37. Id. at 470, 475; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2266 (2006). The federal habeas
statute at the time of Rasul authorized district courts, “within their respective jurisdictions,” to entertain habeas applications by persons claiming unlawful detention. §§ 2241(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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their detention at Guantanamo Bay as unlawful under the federal
habeas statute.38 The Supreme Court interpreted the federal habeas
statute as authorizing courts to entertain habeas petitions within their
“respective jurisdictions,” indicating that a court’s jurisdiction is not
limited to “sovereign territory,” but beyond that to “territorial jurisdictions” where the U.S. government exercised significant control.39
This interpretation authorized federal courts to entertain habeas petitions under the federal habeas statute from detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.40 While making this determination, the Court noted the
need for a flexible jurisdictional rule because the United States exerted such large amounts of control over Guantanamo Bay.41 Although the Court did not analyze Rasul under Eisentrager’s constitutional habeas analysis, it still noted certain detainee characteristics
that distinguished Eisentrager:
[Petitioners] are not nationals of countries at war with the
United States, and they deny that they have engaged in or
plotted acts of aggression against the United States; they
have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less
charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more
than two years they have been imprisoned in territory over
which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and
control.42
Following Rasul, the Supreme Court engaged in a back-and-forth
battle with Congress to define the federal courts’ ability to entertain
petitions under the federal habeas statute by detainees held at Guantanamo Bay. First, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 (DTA), effectively stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to
entertain habeas corpus petitions.43 Following the DTA, the Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,44 ruled that courts could enter38. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470–71.
39. Id. at 481–82.
40. Id. at 484.
41. Id. at 478.
42. Id. at 476.
43. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat.
2739, 2742 (2005).
44. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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tain petitions filed before the DTA was enacted in 2005.45 In response to Hamdan, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act
of 2006,46 which suspended any and all statutory petitions for habeas
corpus relief by any detainee held after September 11, 2001.47 Now
that federal courts were entirely stripped of any authority to entertain
habeas petitions under the federal habeas statute, the question remained whether habeas corpus protections under the Constitution
could extend extraterritorially to foreign nationals at Guantanamo
Bay and beyond.
C. Boumediene v. Bush
Constitutional habeas corpus is considered a “privilege not to be
withdrawn except in conformance with the Suspension Clause.”48 In
2008, the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush revisited a constitutional issue that the Eisentrager Court appeared to have already
answered: “whether foreign nationals, apprehended and detained in
distant counties during a time of serious threats to our Nation’s security, may assert the privilege of the writ and seek its protection.”49
Identifying constitutional habeas corpus as the “surest safeguard of
liberty,”50 the Court ruled that detainees held beyond U.S. sovereign
territory at Guantanamo Bay, who have never stepped foot within
the United States and who have no connection with the United States
other than capture by U.S. authorities, could invoke Suspension
Clause protections and petition for habeas corpus relief in the federal
courts.51
By comparing and contrasting the facts in Boumediene to Eisentrager, the majority adopted an objective and practical three-factor
balancing test to determine the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause:

45. Id. at 575–77.
46. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600,
2636 (2006) (amended 2009).
47. Id.
48. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).
49. Id. at 746.
50. Id. at 745.
51. Id. at 771.
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[A]t least three factors are relevant in determining the reach
of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the
detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that
status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites
where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3)
the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.52
Applying these three factors to the detainees held at Guantanamo
Bay, the Court deviated from Eisentrager’s view that territorial sovereignty is the driving determination and reason for not extending
constitutional habeas corpus protections beyond U.S. sovereign territory. Under the first factor, the process afforded the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay was considerably less than the process in Eisentrager.53
Under the second factor, the degree of U.S. de facto sovereignty,
or level of government control, over Guantanamo Bay since 1903,
compared to the German prison in Eisentrager, drove the Court’s
ruling that the Suspension Clause extends beyond simply U.S. de
jure, or legal, sovereign territory.54 Thus, although the United States
did not exercise de jure territorial sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay
because the base sat beyond the U.S. legal border, it did maintain
sufficient de facto sovereignty, or objective government control,
over the base such that it weighed in favor of extending habeas corpus protections to the detainees.55
Under the third factor, few practical obstacles existed compared
to post-World War II Germany because Guantanamo Bay sat beyond
an active theater of war, and extending the Suspension Clause protections would have little effect on the military mission.56 Within
two years of this decision, these practical Boumediene factors would

52. Id. at 766.
53. Id. at 766–67.
54. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754–55, 768–69. “De facto” means “existing in
fact” or “having effect even though not formally or legally recognized.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 448 (8th ed. 2004). “De jure” means “[e]xisting by right or
according to law.” Id. at 458.
55. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754–55, 768–69.
56. Id. at 769–70.
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be tested and applied to a detention facility halfway around the
world: the Bagram Theater Internment Facility in Afghanistan.
III. AL MAQALEH V. GATES AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF
THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE TO BAGRAM DETAINEES
The Bagram Theater Internment Facility (Bagram) comprises a
large, multi-nationally operated detention facility located in Afghanistan.57 Upwards of 650 detainees are housed at Bagram, which the
Republic of Afghanistan has maintained sovereignty over and leased
to the United States and Coalition Forces for military purposes.58
However, the United States possesses “complete jurisdiction and
control” over Bagram and has the right to remain at Bagram as long
as it desires.59
Al Maqaleh is a unique case because, as the D.C. District Court
recognized, it is the “first application of the multi-factor functional
test crafted by the Supreme Court in Boumediene.”60 The case involved four detainee petitioners held as unlawful enemy combatants
at Bagram.61 Two detainees were confined since 2002 and a third
since 2003.62 All four detainees were allegedly captured beyond
Afghanistan in Pakistan, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates
and later brought into the Afghanistan theater of war and confined at
Bagram.63
A. The D.C. District Court
Even after Boumediene, the government maintained that territorial sovereignty should determine whether the Suspension Clause

57. See Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited
Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 857 (2010).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 858.
60. Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh I), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207–08 (D.D.C.
2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
61. Id. at 209.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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extends to the Bagram detainees.64 Before discussing territorial sovereignty, however, the district court set the stage for its opinion by
emphasizing that “petitioners have been in custody for six years with
no definitive judicial determination as to the legality of their detention.”65 Recognizing that the only material difference between the
Guantanamo Bay detainees and the Bagram detainees was the location of confinement,66 the district court proceeded to apply Boumediene’s three-factor test to the Bagram detainees and hold that the
Suspension Clause extended extraterritorially to Bagram.67 For the
sake of analysis, the court divided the three Boumediene factors into
six:
(1) the citizenship of the detainee; (2) the status of the detainee; (3) the adequacy of the process through which the status
determination was made; (4) the nature of the site of apprehension; (5) the nature of the site of detention; and (6) the
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the petitioner’s entitlement to the writ.68
The district court then assigned the factors different weight by characterizing them as either “primary drivers” or factors deserving
lesser weight in Boumediene’s multi-factor analysis.69 Assigned to
the “primary drivers” group were the nature of the site of detention,
the adequacy of process, and the practical obstacles.70 First applying
the three factors of lesser weight, the court found that the Bagram
detainees were similarly situated to the Guantanamo Bay detainees,
as the Bagram detainees were not U.S. citizens, were labeled as
64. After President Obama took office in January 2009, the district court “invited
[the government] to notify the Court whether they intended to refine the position
they had taken to date” on the jurisdictional question. Id. at 210. In essence, the
court asked the new Administration whether it would retain the Bush Administration’s argument that the right of habeas corpus does not extend to noncitizens being held beyond the United States’ sovereign territory. The government responded
that it “adheres to its previously articulated position.” Id.
65. Id. at 208 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008)).
66. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d. at 214.
67. See id. at 215–225.
68. Id. at 215.
69. Id. at 218.
70. Id.
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“enemy combatants,” and were apprehended beyond U.S. sovereign
territory.71
In applying the “primary drivers” group, the court first addressed
the nature of the site of detention by examining the United States’
“objective degree of control” over Bagram.72 The court found that
the United States maintained “near-total operational control” over
Bagram, even though U.S. jurisdictional authority over Bagram was
considerably less than the degree of control over Guantanamo Bay.73
Noticeably absent from the site-of-detention analysis was territorial
sovereignty; the entire analysis focused on the objective degree of
U.S. government control over Bagram, up to and including the
length of the property lease and future intention to remain at the
base.74
The application of the next “primary driver”—adequacy of the
status determination process—required a comparison of the process
afforded to the Bagram detainees to that afforded to the Guantanamo
Bay detainees.75 Interestingly, while the Supreme Court found in
Boumediene that the Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantanamo Bay were an inadequate process substitute for habeas corpus
protections,76 the government in Al Maqaleh conceded that the Bagram detainees’ status-determination process was even “less comprehensive” than the review tribunals at Guantanamo Bay.77 Therefore, this factor weighed in favor of extending the Suspension Clause
to the Bagram detainees.
71. Id. at 218–21.
72. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 222–23.
73. Id. at 222.
74. See id. at 222–23.
75. Id. at 226–27.
76. See Boumediene v. Gates, 553 U.S. 723, 767 (2008).
77. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 227. The district court summarized the
status determination process afforded to the Bagram detainees:
Bagram detainees represent themselves. Obvious obstacles, including
language and cultural differences, obstruct effective self-representation
by petitioners such as these. Detainees cannot even speak for themselves;
they are only permitted to submit a written statement. But in submitting
that statement, detainees do not know what evidence the United States relies upon to justify an “enemy combatant” designation–so they lack a
meaningful opportunity to rebut that evidence.
Id.
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The last “primary driver”—practical obstacles in extending the
Suspension Clause to Bagram—considered various obstacles, including the effect on the military mission, issues in evidence and fact
gathering, and whether the detention site is located in an active theater of war.78 The court sympathized with the fact that Bagram was
under constant threats of suicide bombers in the war theater, but emphasized that Bagram was under near-total U.S. control.79 The government stressed the practical difficulties in evidence and fact gathering as well as providing counsel to detainees for habeas corpus
hearings; this argument was quickly discounted, however, by focusing on the technological advances since Eisentrager.80 Furthermore,
the high degree of U.S. control over Bagram, along with the fact that
the detainees were captured beyond Afghanistan and later transferred
into the Afghanistan theater, discounted any concern that the site of
detention was located in an active theater of war.81 Ultimately, after
balancing these weighted factors, the court held that Bagram was no
different from Guantanamo Bay, and, thus, the Suspension Clause
and its protections must extend to the Bagram detainees.82
B. The D.C. Circuit
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit performed the same Boumediene
analysis but reached a drastically different outcome. The court began by sticking with Boumediene’s three-factor test rather than the
district court’s six-factor test.83 As to the first factor, it agreed with
the district court that the Bagram detainees were similarly situated to
the Guantanamo Bay detainees and that they had received an inadequate process substitute.84

78. Id. at 227–30.
79. Id. at 228.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 230–31.
82. Id. at 231. The court, however, ruled against extending the Suspension
Clause protections to the Afghan detainee petitioner because of the inevitable
practical obstacle when the Afghan government takes over custody of that detainee. See id.
83. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84, 93–94 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
84. Id. at 96.
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The application of second and third factors—the nature of the
apprehension and detention sites and the practical obstacles in extending the Suspension Clause—illustrates a large analysis disconnect between the D.C. Circuit and the D.C. District Court.85 The
second factor, according to the D.C. Circuit, weighed “heavily” in
favor of not extending the Suspension Clause to Bagram for two reasons.86 First, the detainees were captured abroad, so, under the
second factor, the site of apprehension itself weighed against extending the Suspension Clause.87 Second, although the United States
exerted some degree of control over Bagram and its military operations, the level of de facto sovereignty over Bagram—mainly the
short lease and lack of intent to occupy the base indefinitely—simply
did not compare to Guantanamo Bay, and, therefore, weighed
against extending the Suspension Clause protections to Bagram.88
The third factor weighed “overwhelmingly” in favor of not extending the Suspension Clause to Bagram, mainly because Afghanistan
remains an active theater of war.89 Ultimately, after balancing the
three factors, the D.C. Circuit reversed and refused to extend the
Suspension Clause to the Bagram detainees because the second and
third factors weighed so heavily against extending constitutional
habeas protections in this case.90
IV. ANALYSIS
A. What is Left of Territorial Sovereignty in Today’s Habeas Corpus Analysis?
The case law development from Eisentrager to Al Maqaleh illustrates an evolving standard in extraterritorial habeas jurisprudence.
One factor certainly affected in this evolution is the role of territorial
sovereignty. Arguably, territorial sovereignty is no longer the driving habeas determination that the Eisentrager majority once envi85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See id. at 96–98.
Id. at 96.
Id.
Id. at 97.
Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 97.
Id. at 98–99.
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sioned. The change from de jure to de facto sovereignty and the
emerging consideration of fluid, more practical factors in the Boumediene analysis creates an uncertain future for territorial sovereignty at Bagram and future foreign detention sites.
1. Changing Definition of Sovereignty
The recent change in focus from de jure to de facto sovereignty
has greatly affected the role that territorial sovereignty will play in
future detainee habeas cases. Justice Jackson’s majority opinion in
Eisentrager discussed the inherent significance of territorial sovereignty in determining the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension
Clause:
We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other
country where the writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an
alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in no stage of his
captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction. Nothing
in the text of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does
anything in our statutes.91
Justice Jackson went on to state that “in extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out
that it was the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that
gave the Judiciary power to act.”92
Justice Jackson clearly indicated that de jure territorial sovereignty, as defined by the legal borders marking United States’ territory,93 is the driving factor determining the reach of the Suspension
Clause. In fact, the reason Bush Administration officials selected
Guantanamo Bay to hold accused terrorist detainees was not a coincidence: The Administration believed that Eisentrager’s precedent
would put Guantanamo Bay beyond the reach of the law and the
courts.94
91. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950).
92. Id. at 771.
93. For the definition of “territoriality,” see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1512
(8th ed. 2004).
94. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 828 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he President’s Office of Legal Counsel advised [the President] that the great
weight of legal authority indicates that a federal district court could not properly
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But then came Boumediene, where Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, stressed the importance of analyzing the territoriality
question not in a “narrow technical sense,” but as the “degree of control the military asserted over the facility.”95 Justice Kennedy went
on to state that “[n]othing in Eisentrager says that de jure sovereignty is or has ever been the only relevant consideration in determining
the geographic reach of the Constitution or of habeas corpus.”96
In any event, no longer will U.S. borders determine the reach of
the Suspension Clause; rather, the determination will be made on a
case-by-case basis after considering the degree of U.S. government
control asserted over a particular facility or location. Justice Kennedy even acknowledged the Court’s rather remarkable change on this
territoriality ruling:
It is true that before today the Court has never held that noncitizens detained by our Government in territory over which
another country maintains de jure sovereignty have any
rights under our Constitution. But the cases before us lack
any precise historical parallel. They involve individuals detained by executive order for the duration of a conflict that, if
measured from September 11, 2001, to the present, is already
among the longest wars in American history. The detainees,
moreover, are held in a territory that, while technically not
part of the United States, is under the complete and total control of our Government. Under these circumstances the lack
of a precedent on point is no barrier to our holding.97
Considering today’s globalization and the level of U.S. presence
in international conflicts, this change from de jure to de facto sovereignty was appropriate. As a policy matter, territorial sovereignty
should not determine the reach of the Suspension Clause to foreign
detention sites when the United States asserts such high levels of
control over these facilities all around the world. However, the
change from de jure to de facto sovereignty has resulted in uncerexercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained at Guantanamo Bay.”) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Sherman, supra note 35, at 208.
95. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 763.
96. Id. at 764.
97. Id. at 770–71 (internal citation omitted).
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tainty and disconnect between the two Al Maqaleh courts in analyzing and applying this standard to the Bagram detainees. When analyzing the site of detention, the D.C. District Court held that the
United States’ “high objective degree of control at Bagram” supported extending the Suspension Clause to the Bagram detainees.98
The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, held that the site of detention
weighed “strongly” against extending the Suspension Clause to Bagram because the detainees were apprehended abroad and the United
States failed to exert as much control over Bagram as it did over
Guantanamo Bay.99
These polar-opposite holdings illustrate a disconnect that is ripe
for Supreme Court review. Al Maqaleh presents an opportunity for
the Supreme Court to define an objective standard or principle on
which to base the degree of control necessary to weigh in favor of
extending the Suspension Clause extraterritorially. While both
courts in Al Maqaleh used the degree of U.S. control at Guantanamo
Bay as the guiding principle on which to compare this factor, they
The extraterritorial habeas
reached opposite conclusions.100
precedent is fairly limited and recent, and Al Maqaleh illustrates the
lower courts’ struggles in applying Boumediene’s site-of-detention
analysis. While Boumediene stressed using objective factors with
practical concerns to evaluate the reach of the Suspension Clause,101
courts are struggling to determine exactly what objective facts and
practical concerns are relevant in this inquiry. The Supreme Court
must address how the “objective degree of control”102 is to be determined as well as the standard on which to base this determination
and weigh in favor of, or against, extending the Suspension Clause
protections.
98. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 226 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
99. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
100. Some of the disconnect in Al Maqaleh’s opposite holdings can be attributed
to the district court’s decision to split up the factors and remove the site of apprehension from the court’s site-of-detention analysis, which the court of appeals
found relevant and included in its analysis. However, the courts’ determinations
regarding the site of detention and level of U.S. control over Bagram clearly remain in conflict and deserve Supreme Court review.
101. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008).
102. Id. at 763.
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2. Multiple Factors Beyond Territorial Sovereignty
The emergence of Boumediene’s multi-factor test also greatly affects the role of territorial sovereignty in future detainee habeas cases. In Boumediene, for the first time the Supreme Court used a multi-factor, practical approach when analyzing the extraterritorial reach
of the Suspension Clause.103 However, reasonable minds may differ
in deciding whether Boumediene actually expanded or modified Eisentrager’s historical standard and precedent.104 On the one hand,
Boumediene merely clarified precedent already established in Eisentrager. The majority in Boumediene analyzed extensive case law
and found a “common thread” in history and precedent showing that
“questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.”105 To support this claim, Justice Kennedy referenced the various practical factors—beyond just territorial
sovereignty—that Eisentrager found relevant in denying the German
nationals’ petitions for habeas relief.106
On the other hand, the Supreme Court arguably greatly expanded
and modified the standard for analyzing the extraterritorial reach of
the Suspension Clause. For instance, in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy was mindful that the Supreme Court has been “careful not to
foreclose the possibility that the protections of the Suspension
Clause have expanded along with post-1789 developments that define the present scope of the writ,”107 indicating that the Court could
expand the Suspension Clause protections after Eisentrager. Justice
Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, also attacked the multi-factor test as
a complete departure from history and precedent established in Eisentrager.108 Justice Scalia reiterated the predominance of territorial
sovereignty when he stated “[l]est there be any doubt about the primacy of territorial sovereignty in determining the jurisdiction of a
103. See id. at 766.
104. See Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 57, at 875 (discussing whether Eisentrager was decided on “purely territoriality and status grounds” or other, more
practical factors).
105. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764.
106. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
107. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746 (emphasis added).
108. See id. at 833–35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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habeas court over an alien” and that “Eisentrager thus held . . . that
the Constitution does not ensure habeas for aliens held by the United
States in areas over which our Government is not sovereign.”109 In
Al Maqaleh, the D.C. Circuit even stated that it “read Eisentrager as
holding that constitutional habeas rights did not extend to any aliens
who had never been in or brought into the sovereign territory of the
United States.”110 Even the government’s chief argument in both
Boumediene and Al Maqaleh was that detainees held beyond the
U.S. borders have no constitutional habeas corpus rights.111 Today,
the emergence of various factors, including the status-determination
process, the site of apprehension and detention (with a focus on de
facto sovereignty), and the practical obstacles in extending the Suspension Clause has certainly diminished the role that territorial sovereignty will play in future detainee habeas cases.112
So what role should territorial sovereignty play in future foreign
detainee habeas cases? Territorial sovereignty has maintained at
least some presence in the current analysis. For instance, the Boumediene test is not required for a detainee held within U.S. sovereign
territory.113 Territorial sovereignty also remains present in the
second factor regarding the site of apprehension: apprehension
beyond U.S. sovereign territory weighs against extending the Suspension Clause to the detainee.114 However, the analysis on the site
of detention has clearly shifted to focusing on, and analyzing, the
objective degree of government control over the detention site and
not whether the site of detention, or site of apprehension for that
matter, is beyond U.S. sovereign territory.115 Thus, what once was a
109. Id. at 835 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
111. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739; Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 210
(D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
112. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
113. Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 57, at 881.
114. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768.
115. See id. (discussing at length the Government’s control of Guantanamo Bay,
stating that “[i]n every practical sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within the
constant jurisdiction of the United States”); see also Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d
at 221 (“The touchstone of the site of detention factor is the ‘objective degree of
control’ the United States has over Bagram.”) (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at
754). But see James Thornburg, Comment, Balancing Act in Black Robes: Extra-
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“touchstone” factor116 driving a court’s determination in foreign detainee habeas cases has been greatly diminished. In future detainee
habeas cases, analyzing the objective degree of U.S. government
control over a detention site, rather than whether the United States
apprehended and held a detainee beyond its sovereign territory,
would produce a more just and accurate result. With today’s globalized conflicts and high levels of U.S. presence and control over foreign detention sites, courts should question whether territorial sovereignty should play any role in future detainee habeas cases.
B. The Future of the Habeas Factors: Additional Factors and Unanswered Questions
Given the rather limited and young precedent on the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause in detainee habeas cases, the
future of the Boumediene factors is uncertain. The multi-factor test
was meant to be “detainee-specific” rather than a bright-line standard applied to every detainee.117 Thus, the future expects further
litigation involving the application of Boumediene’s multi-factor test
to Bagram and other foreign detention sites. Al Maqaleh demonstrates that Boumediene’s multi-factor test is not defined and, at a
minimum, should encompass better guidance and additional factors.
This section provides recommendations and discusses unanswered
questions for future detainee habeas cases applying the Boumediene
test: the need for additional factors, more guidance on the third,
practical-obstacles factor, and weights that should be assigned to the
“primary drivers.”
1. Additional Factors in Response to Today’s Conflicts
Boumediene stated that “at least” three factors are relevant to determining the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause.118 The
phrase “at least” indicates that Boumediene’s multi-factor test is not
territorial Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction Beyond Boumediene, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 85,
96 (2010) (arguing that the second factor only favors Suspension Clause extension
when the site of detention is within the sovereign territory of the United States).
116. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755.
117. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 215.
118. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
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exclusive or foreclosed from modification. As international conflicts
develop in the future, the military mission, international law, and the
laws of war are certain to adapt to these changes. Boumediene’s
three-factor habeas analysis is certain to adapt as well.
a. Length of Confinement Without Adequate Status Review
Al Maqaleh presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
add an additional practical factor to the Boumediene test: the detainee’s length of confinement without adequate status review.119
While Boumediene failed to include this factor as part of its habeas
test, the Supreme Court was mindful that the Guantanamo Bay detainees spent six years in confinement without any adequate status
review:
The gravity of the separation-of-powers issues raised by
these cases and the fact that these detainees have been denied
meaningful access to a judicial forum for a period of years
render these cases exceptional.120
....
In some of these cases six years have elapsed without the
judicial oversight that habeas corpus or an adequate substitute demands. And there has been no showing that the Executive faces such onerous burdens that it cannot respond to
habeas corpus actions.121
The district court in Al Maqaleh even went so far as to claim that
the length of detainee detention without adequate status review is
already an additional factor to be analyzed in the multi-factor test.122
Yet, when the D.C. Circuit reversed, it made no mention of the detainees’ length of confinement. With the right to habeas corpus considered by the Supreme Court as one of the “few safeguards of liberty,”123 length of confinement without adequate status review should
119.
216.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See id. at 799–800 (Souter, J., concurring); Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 772.
Id. at 794.
See Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745.
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encompass a stand-alone factor in today’s extraterritorial habeas
analysis. This additional factor would actually represent precisely
what the right to habeas corpus is meant to protect: indefinite executive detention without adequate process and review determinations
by a detached judicial officer.124
With occupation at Bagram now many years and likely to extend
further into the future, courts should recognize the inherent risk in
indefinite detention without adequate status review procedures.
While there is no U.S. intention to occupy Bagram with “permanence,”125 the intent is to remain at Bagram until military operations
have concluded.126 And every indication is that the current hostilities will not come to any formal completion soon.127 The district
court in Al Maqaleh recognized this problem, stating that the United
States’ “promise may be no more than a distant hope given the indefinite nature of our global efforts against terrorism.”128 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has recognized the right to habeas corpus as the
“surest safeguard of liberty.”129 Under the circumstances with Iraq
and Afghanistan, unreasonable executive detention until all hostilities have ended also runs contrary to America’s fundamental principles of freedom, democracy, and basic rights and liberties. This
right deserves an extension to those individuals detained by the U.S.
executive branch for unreasonable periods without adequate status
review.
b. Executive Manipulation
A second factor that deserves inclusion into the Boumediene test
would analyze whether the executive branch transferred the detainee
124. See id.
125. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
126. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 224–25 (citing Press Release, The White
House, Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership,
THE WHITE HOUSE (May 23, 2005), available at http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/
afghanistan/WH/20050523-2.pdf).
127. See, e.g., Heidi Vogt, NATO: Combat Role in Afghanistan Could Pass 2014,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/11/17/nato-combat-role-in-afgha_n_784680.html.
128. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 225.
129. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745.
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into an active theater of war following apprehension. This factor
would guard against potential executive manipulation by transferring
detainees into an active theater of war, thereby distorting Boumediene’s third factor—practical obstacles in extending the Suspension
Clause. Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh even invited
the Supreme Court to modify the three-factor test by adding “manipulation by the Executive.”130
Maintaining the current three-factor test risks executive manipulation by transferring detainees beyond the reach of the Suspension
Clause. In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy briefly noted that, had
Guantanamo Bay been located within an active theater of war, the
practical obstacles would weigh against extending the Suspension
Clause protections to the detainees.131 In Al Maqaleh, all four Bagram detainees were allegedly captured beyond Afghanistan and
later transferred into the Afghanistan theater.132 Relying on Justice
Kennedy’s statement in Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit held that the
third factor weighed “overwhelmingly” in favor of not extending the
Suspension Clause to the Bagram detainees because Bagram remained in an active theater of war.133 Thus, once the government
transfers a detainee into an active theater, the practical-obstacles factor, considered a “primary driver” under the habeas test,134 is greatly
affected.
2. Unanswered Questions
Granted, a multi-factor balancing test only begs for arbitrary applications and rulings.135 Illustrated by the conflicting outcomes in
Al Maqaleh, unanswered questions remain as to how the Boumediene factors should be applied. The first is whether the Supreme
Court should adopt the D.C. District Court’s assignment of weights
to the “primary drivers” under the current detainee habeas analy130. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 99.
131. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770.
132. See Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
133. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 97.
134. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 218.
135. See Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 57, at 887 (discussing the risk in analyzing the functional test in a “theoretical vacuum” that would lead to applying the
writ “random or even unprincipled”).
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sis.136 The Supreme Court was not clear in Boumediene whether
certain weight, or equal weight, should be given to each factor. The
D.C. District Court correctly pointed out, though, that three of the
actual six factors—site of detention, adequacy of the process, and
practical obstacles—clearly drove the Court’s analysis in Boumediene.137 Thus, the district court assigned these three factors as the
“primary drivers” in the Boumediene analysis.138 Arguably, the
three “primary drivers” encompass precisely what the writ of habeas
corpus is meant to protect: unreasonable executive detention without
adequate process and status review. Thus, the Supreme Court should
carefully consider modifying the Boumediene test to accurately reflect the writ’s purpose.
Second, courts have focused heavily on the adequacy of the
process afforded to detainees, but have failed to answer exactly how
much process is considered “adequate” under today’s Boumediene
test. In both Boumediene and Al Maqaleh, the procedures were
found to be inadequate substitutes for habeas corpus protections.139
Without delving into particular process characteristics afforded in
the Combatant Status Review Tribunals and the Unlawful Enemy
Combatant Review Board at Guantanamo Bay and Bagram, respectively, the procedures lacked one clear process demand: review by a
detached judicial officer.140 Furthermore, the seemingly broad definition of “enemy combatant” used for status determinations in Afghanistan and Iraq reflects the need for an objective, guiding principle
or standard to analyze exactly what process would be considered an
“adequate” habeas substitute in current and future status determinations.141
But how much process should be considered “adequate” under
today’s habeas test? The courts have not answered this question, and
136. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 218.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 790–92 (2008); Al Maqaleh II, 605
F.3d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
140. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 786 (“For the writ of habeas corpus, or its substitute, to function as an effective and proper remedy in this context, the court that
conducts the habeas proceeding must have the means to correct errors that occurred during the CSRT proceedings.”).
141. See Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
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it is beyond the scope of this Note to answer.142 The Boumediene
Court was even mindful to not state that the Guantanamo Bay detainees were entitled to guaranteed constitutional due process. Even
the D.C. District Court in Al Maqaleh brushed over this issue when
it stated that “[t]his court need not determine how extensive process
must be to stave off the reach of the Suspension Clause to Bagram.”143 However, having an objective standard or principle by
which to determine what is adequate process under the Boumediene
test would allow military commanders and executive branch officials
to formulate and implement satisfactory policies in future conflicts.
C. Guidance on the Practical Obstacles
Lastly, Al Maqaleh presents another opportunity for the Supreme
Court to provide further guidance on the practical-obstacles factor.
As mentioned earlier, the inherent deficiency of a multi-factored,
functional test is its arbitrary and unequal application.144 The Boumediene Court’s deficient guidance on the practical-obstacles factor
only exacerbates this problem. Unquestionably, deference to the
President and military leaders regarding decisions on military necessity, operations in an active theater of war, and reasonable detention
of enemy combatants should not be circumvented. However, questions remain regarding the risk of executive manipulation of the
Boumediene test.145 For instance, one question is the effect on the
practical-obstacles analysis when a detainee is captured beyond an
active theater of war and later transported into an active theater for
detention. This scenario played out in Al Maqaleh. In our current
“Global War on Terrorism,” another lingering question is the actual
142. For a discussion on the “adequate process” needed to support substituting
habeas protection, see Michael J. Buxton, Note, No Habeas For You! Al Maqaleh
v. Gates, the Bagram Detainees, and the Global Insurgency, 60 AM. U. L. REV.
519, 530–33 (2010); Saxby Chambliss, The Future of Detainees in the Global War
on Terror: A U.S. Policy Perspective, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 821, 835–40 (2009).
143. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 227.
144. See Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 57, at 887 (discussing the risk in analyzing the functional test in a “theoretical vacuum” that would lead to applying the
writ “random or even unprincipled”).
145. See Davis, supra note 15, at 1224–26 (discussing problems associated with
the practical-obstacles factor).
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boundaries of an active theater of war.146 A detainee should not be
denied Suspension Clause protections because the government
transported him into an active theater where the Suspension Clause
would arguably not reach. Furthermore, another question is the effect of military necessity and the military mission on the practicalobstacles factor. These questions require that a delicate and fine line
be drawn. On one hand are the surest safeguards of liberty and the
separation of powers check on the executive.147 On the other hand is
the importance of the military mission and executive deference in
international conflict policy decisions.
The answer to these questions must include some level of deference to the legitimate needs of the armed forces in advancing the
military mission148 but also address the pertinent constitutional issues that cannot be overlooked. Safe to say, the writ of habeas corpus is one of these pertinent constitutional issues. However, as the
Boumediene Court recognized, the executive branch is entitled to a
“reasonable period of time” before a court will entertain a habeas
corpus petition from a detainee.149 This reasonable period of time is
necessary to allow the military to screen and review the detainee and
determine the detainee’s combatant status.150 This balance between
the military mission and an individual’s surest safeguard of liberty
will allow the courts to maintain a practical, functional, and detainee-by-detainee, detention-site-by-detention-site application of the
habeas test that the Boumediene Court envisioned.

146. See generally Buxton, supra note 142, at 524–29 (discussing the effect of
global insurgency on habeas jurisprudence).
147. See Davis, supra note 15, at 1204–05.
148. This is related to the “military deference doctrine,” where courts routinely
defer to military administrative and operational decisions. See John F. O’Connor,
The Origins and Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV.
161, 165–66 (2000); Phillip Carter, Judicial Deference to Military May Affect Gay
Rights, War on Terror, CNN (July 15, 2003), http://www.cnn.com/2003/
LAW/07/15/findlaw.analysis.carter.security.
149. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793–94 (2008).
150. See id.

File: Nelson - Vol. 9, Iss. 2, V2 (updated; use this doc)

324

Created on: 3/16/2011 9:38:00 PM

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

V.

Last Printed: 3/21/2011 10:19:00 AM

Vol. 9, No. 2

CONCLUSION

Over time, technology, globalization, and the media have greatly
impacted the laws of war and how wars are fought.151 Conflicts are
no longer fought on a single front, but rather on a global front, both
internationally and domestically.152 The enemy is no longer a recognized and uniformed nation, but rather terrorist cells or groups
stationed all around the world.153 Thus, the laws of every nation,
principles of international law, and the laws of warfare must evolve
and adapt to these changing dynamics in armed conflict.154 The
Suspension Clause jurisprudence has evidently evolved during the
most recent international armed conflict. Al Maqaleh illustrates how
territorial sovereignty is no longer the driving factor in today’s extraterritorial habeas analysis. Additionally, the Boumediene factors are
in need of further evolution. This Note attempted to highlight some
of these needed changes as well as address some unanswered questions for the Supreme Court to consider. One thing certain, however,
is that unreasonable executive detention without adequate status reviews from a detached judicial officer is simply not the answer.
Currently, the United States is constructing a new forty-acre
prison at Bagram Air Base, set to house hundreds of additional detainees.155 Uncertainty exists today whether military commissions,
federal courts, or another venue will serve to prosecute accused ter-

151. See, e.g., BRUCE BERKOWITZ, THE NEW FACE OF WAR: HOW WAR WILL BE
FOUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 1–9 (2007) (discussing information technology’s
impact on war fighting); Jennifer Barrett, Live From Iraq, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 26,
2003, http://www.newsweek.com/2003/03/25/live-from-iraq.html# (discussing the
media’s evolution of war coverage).
152. See Jason Rineheart, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency, PERSP. ON
TERRORISM, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine
&view=article&id=138 (“After 9/11, Al-Qaeda’s network across national borders
was characterized by many as a global insurgency. This new insurgency threat
was not only local, it was international, which as some argue, requires a rethinking of how such irregular warfare should be combated.”).
153. See id.
154. See John B. Bellinger, III, Terrorism and Changes to the Laws of War, 20
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 331, 335–37 (2010) (discussing the inherent problem in
traditional armed conflict in the post-9/11 war fighting).
155. Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 57, at 857.
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rorist detainees.156 As more detainees are housed at Bagram and
new conflicts emerge in the future, issues regarding detainee rights
will not go away. In his dissenting opinion in Eisentrager, Justice
Black provided a possible solution to some of today’s struggles over
detainee rights.157 At the time considered a far-reaching solution,
Justice Black proposed that constitutional habeas corpus rights need
not be judged upon an alien’s identity with the United States, or even
physical presence on U.S. territory, but rather that constitutional habeas corpus protections should extend to “all persons coming within
the ambit of our power.”158 In today’s globalized world with ongoing international conflicts and U.S. presence, Justice Black’s solution may not seem so far-reaching after all.

156. See Daphne Eviatar, Detainee Task Force Recommends Reformed Military
Commissions to Try Some Gitmo Detainees, WASH. INDEP. (July 21, 2009),
http://washingtonindependent.com/51889/detainee-task-force-recommendsreformed-military-commissions-to-try-some-gitmo-detainees.
157. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
158. Id.

